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The Role of Modality and Awareness in Language Learning 
 
Abstract 
There is conflicting empirical evidence regarding the role of awareness in second 
language learning. Possible explanations for the contradictory results include the modality in 
the exposure and assessment phases of previous experiments. Our study investigated the 
acquisition of a novel determiner system under incidental exposure conditions and examined 
the effect of modality in both exposure and assessment phases. Animacy served as a hidden 
regularity in the determiners which were embedded in sentences and presented to Chinese 
speakers of English either in auditory or visual mode. Learning was assessed by a two-
alternative forced-choice test either auditorily or in writing. Implicit and explicit knowledge 
were measured using retrospective verbal reports and source judgements. Bayesian analysis 
provided moderate evidence for above chance level learning. Significant learning effects 
were observed regardless of whether participants based their accuracy judgements on explicit 
or implicit knowledge. Bayesian analysis showed moderate evidence for above chance 
learning effects for aware participants. Generalized linear mixed-effects modelling revealed a 
small-size significant benefit of the auditory exposure modality over the written modality but 
indicated no significant effect of the modality of assessment or awareness. Our research 
underscores the importance of considering the role of modality of exposure in incidental L2 
learning contexts. 
 





There are differing views and conflicting empirical evidence regarding the role of 
awareness in second language (L2) acquisition. On the one hand, the view that awareness is 
necessary for L2 acquisition in adulthood (Schmidt, 1990) is supported by a number of 
empirical studies (e.g., Leow, 1997, 2000). On the other hand, Williams (2005) proposed that 
learning a novel language in adulthood can occur without awareness, such as  in the case of 
the acquisition of form-meaning connections. Several studies have adapted Williams’s (2005) 
paradigm in order to contribute to the debate on the role of awareness in language learning 
(e.g., Chen, Guo, Tang, Zhu, Yang, & Dienes, 2011; Faretta-Stuttenberg & Morgan-Short, 
2011; Hama & Leow, 2010; Kerz, Wiechmann & Riedel, 2017; Rebuschat, Hamrick, Sachs, 
Riestenberg, & Ziegler, 2013; Rebuschat, Hamrick, Riestenberg, Sachs & Ziegler 2015), but 
results have been contradictory, with no clear evidence supporting either position. 
In part, the conflicting findings in these studies can be explained by important 
conceptual differences. Williams (2005), following the tradition in cognitive psychology 
(Reber, 1967, onwards), focused on the implicitness of the learning product, that is, what was 
learned by participants, while Leow (1997, 2000; Hama & Leow, 2010), approaching the 
topic from the perspective of the field of Second Language Acquisition (SLA), focused on 
the implicitness of the learning process, that is, how learning took place. Given their 
respective orientations, the authors measured different, albeit inter-related, aspects of 
language learning. Williams (2005) used retrospective verbal reports to establish if learners 
could account for their performance at the end of the experiment. On the other hand, Leow 
(1999, 2000) pioneered the use of concurrent verbal reports to assess awareness at the time of 
encoding (see Rebuschat, 2013, for review). 
Another potential explanation for the conflicting findings might be the changes in 
modality between exposure and testing phases in the studies (cf. Hama & Leow, 2010). 
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Williams (2005) and Faretta-Stutenberg and Morgan-Short (2011) trained participants on 
auditory sentences but tested them on written items. In contrast, Hama and Leow (2010) and 
Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015) kept the modality constant. However, Hama and Leow trained 
and tested participants on auditory items, while Rebuschat et al. did so with written items (for 
a recent overview see Kim & Godfroid, 2019). It is well-known that modality makes a 
difference in memory recall (Shanks & St. John, 1994), and there is recent evidence 
suggesting that modality also plays a key role in implicit learning (Frost, Armstrong, 
Siegelman, & Christiansen, 2015). However, there is a scarcity of studies that directly 
investigate how input modality might affect the learning of a novel language in adulthood. 
Recently, Kim and Godfroid (2019) addressed this important question, but in their 
participants read out the written sentences, which meant that in the written condition they 
received dual mode input (visual and auditory). 
In the present study, we address this gap by investigating how modality affects the 
acquisition of artificial determiners by Chinese speaking learners of English. We also 
examined the effect of modality on incidental learning in the exposure and testing phases. In 
this paper, we first define key concepts and then provide an overview of prior research that 
has examined the role of awareness in language learning and the impact of modality in 
incidental learning. Next, we describe the procedures of our research and present our findings 
relating to the incidental acquisition of novel form-meaning relationships through visual and 
auditory input. Our results are discussed with reference to previous research and cognitive 
theories of L2 learning. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research. 
Implicit learning, explicit learning and the concept of awareness 
Our ability to unconsciously derive information from the environment is a 
fundamental aspect of human cognition. The concept of implicit learning, that is,  learning 
that occurs without awareness of what was learned, is typically associated with Reber (1967), 
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though interest in the topic precedes Reber’s work (e.g., Thorndike & Rock, 1934). The topic 
has been the focus of extensive theoretical discussion and empirical research in both 
cognitive psychology (Dienes, 2012; Perruchet, 2008) and SLA research (e.g., Williams, 
2009; see contributions in N. Ellis, 1994; Rebuschat, 2015). Awareness plays a key role in 
distinguishing implicit from explicit learning. Implicit learning is typically observed under 
incidental exposure conditions, where participants are not informed about the learning target 
or that they will be tested. This type of experimental manipulation is generally assumed to 
result primarily in implicit (unconscious) knowledge, that is,  knowledge that participants are 
unable to verbalize. In contrast, explicit learning is usually associated with intentional 
exposure conditions, which might involve “conscious comparisons between current and 
previous instances of input and the formation and testing of hypotheses” (Williams, 2005, p. 
271). Explicit learning involves some level of awareness depending on how deeply one 
engages in processing novel L2 forms (Leow, 2018). L2 learners can have lower levels of 
awareness without being able to verbalize L2 rules or linguistic regularities. For example, 
when processing L2 input, learners might be aware of the occurrence of verb forms with past 
tense morphology (walked, jumped, played, etc.) but not fully grasp the underlying rule that 
generates the regular English past tense (adding an -ed to the verb stem). In the former case, 
Schmidt (1990) would argue that learners display awareness at the level of noticing, whereas 
in the latter case they display awareness at the level of understanding. 
 In the field of SLA, Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis (1990, 1995, 2010) distinguishes 
between a narrow and a broad sense of awareness. In the narrow sense, awareness as noticing 
can be considered a surface level phenomenon, namely “conscious registration of the 
occurrence of certain events” (Schmidt, 1995, p.19). This is similar to Tomlin and Villa’s 
(1994) conceptualization of low level of awareness, which they define as “a particular state of 
mind in which an individual has undergone a specific subjective experience of some 
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cognitive content or external stimulus” (p. 193). In the broader sense, awareness as 
understanding involves a deeper level of processing that results in “a state of mind in which 
one has become cognizant of the regularities underlying the data” (Schacter, 1989, p. 577). 
Leow (2018) further suggests that awareness should be operationalized at three levels: 
“behavioral or cognitive change (at the level of noticing), a meta-report of the experience but 
without any metalinguistic description of a targeted underlying rule (at the level of reporting), 
or a metalinguistic description of a targeted underlying rule (at the level of understanding) (p. 
773). The graded nature of awareness underlies Hulstijn’s (2015) argument that explicit and 
implicit learning should not be seen as a dichotomy but rather a continuum. A key question 
for SLA research has been to what extent incidental learning can successfully contribute to 
novel knowledge representations and what depth of processing is needed for learning to take 
place (see Chan & Leung, 2014; Chen et al., 2011, Leow, 2015, Leung & Williams, 2011, 
2012, 2014). 
In his seminal study, Williams (2005) presented initial evidence of learning without 
awareness, which challenged the view that awareness could be a prerequisite for language 
learning in adulthood (Schmidt, 1990). Williams employed an artificial determiner system 
(gi, ro, ul, ne) that encoded both distance (near versus far) and animacy (animate versus 
inanimate) to investigate the acquisition of form-meaning connections under incidental 
exposure conditions. Participants were informed that the four determiners’ functions were 
similar to the English word the, except that meaning of distance was also encoded: gi and ro 
preceded near objects, whereas ul and ne preceded far objects. However, they were not told 
that animacy also played a role in determiner usage, and animacy thus served as a hidden 
regularity. Participants were exposed to this artificial determiner system and later tested only 
on the hidden regularity. Immediately after the test, participants provided retrospective verbal 
reports to determine whether they were aware or unaware of the role that animacy played in 
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determiner choice. Those who “were able to state the specific relationships between the 
determiners and noun animacy” (p. 283) were classified as being aware, those who were not 
able to provide a report were classified as being unaware. 
Williams’s (2005) results showed that 80 per cent of participants reported having no 
awareness of animacy after their first exposure to the test sentences, but their performance 
was still significantly above chance (61% accuracy on generalization items). These unaware 
participants were then exposed to more training items and asked to consciously identify the 
hidden regularity. Despite these instructions, 50% of participants still failed to verbalize the 
hidden regularity, that is, they remained unaware even after an additional round of exposure 
and under intentional exposure conditions. Interestingly, their performance was still 
significantly above chance (58% accuracy). The results were interpreted as evidence that 
learning of form-meaning connections can occur without awareness. 
Several studies have adapted Williams’s (2005) paradigm to further investigate 
whether learning without awareness is possible (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Faretta-Stutenberg & 
Morgan-Short, 2011; Hama & Leow, 2010; Rebuschat et al., 2013, 2015). Hama and Leow 
(2010) extended Williams’s (2005) study by adding (a) another measure of awareness 
(concurrent verbal reports, i.e., think-aloud protocols) and (b) a production task in addition to 
a multiple-choice comprehension test and by keeping (c) the same modality for the exposure 
and testing phases (auditory). The results of Hama and Leow (2010) showed that unaware 
participants performed significantly above chance on both the production and multiple-choice 
assessment tasks. However, analyses of the types of responses revealed that participants 
relied significantly more on distance bias than on animacy bias in both the multiple-choice 
and production tasks. These results were interpreted as a lack of evidence for significant 
learning of the animacy regularity among unaware participants. Faretta-Stutenberg and 
Morgan-Short (2011) also extended Williams’s (2005) study, and their results showed that 
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the performance of unaware participants on generalization test-items was not significantly 
above chance. This supported the findings of Hama and Leow’s (2010) research.  
Chen et al. (2011) adapted Williams’s (2005) design to  native Chinese speakers by 
using Chinese low-frequency characters as determiners and frequent Chinese characters as 
nouns. Their series of experiments conceptually replicated Williams’s (2005) study, showing 
that participants could learn the novel form-meaning mappings when the hidden regularity 
was based on a feature that occurs in natural languages. Importantly, they also showed that 
the acquired knowledge could be implicit (unconscious) as evidenced by trial-by-trial 
subjective measures of awareness (Dienes, 2004, 2012). In this method, participants report, 
for every test judgment, what the basis of their decision was: guess, intuition, recollection or 
rule knowledge. The former two categories are associated with implicit knowledge and the 
latter two with explicit knowledge. 
Like Chen et al. (2011), Rebuschat et al. (2013) also employed subjective measures of 
awareness in their extension of Williams’s (2005) study. However, they also added 
retrospective verbal reports (the awareness measure used by Williams, 2005) to directly 
compare both measures of awareness. This type of comparison is important, given that 
measures are differentially sensitive. After classifying participants as aware and unaware 
based on their retrospective verbal reports, Rebuschat et al. (2013) found that only aware 
participants (those who were able to report the hidden regularity) performed significantly 
above chance on all types of test items, whereas unaware participants did not perform 
significantly above chance on any types of test items. This would suggest that learning was 
linked to awareness, supporting Hama and Leow’s (2010) findings. However, the analyses of 
the subjective measures of awareness revealed that the picture was more complex; their 
participants had acquired both explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) knowledge. 
This result was interpreted as support for Williams (2005). Rebuschat et al. (2015) further 
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expanded this work by comparing three measures of awareness (retrospective verbal reports, 
subjective measures of awareness, and concurrent verbal reports). They found again evidence 
of implicit knowledge (as evidenced by subjective measures of awareness) and that adding 
concurrent verbal reports to the experimental design impacted learning in the group that had 
to think aloud while completing the training task. While the different groups showed a clear 
learning effect, in the case of the think-aloud group, learning appeared limited to recognition 
of items repeated from training during the test phase, that is,  these participants seemed 
unable to generalize the acquired knowledge to novel items. Taken together, studies by 
Williams (2005), Chen et al. (2011) and Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015) suggest that adults are 
able to acquire novel form-meaning connections without intending to and without awareness 
of the acquired knowledge (the product of learning). In contrast, Hama and Leow’s (2010) 
and Faretta-Stutenberg and Morgan-Short ‘s (2011) analyses of unaware participants’ 
performance indicated that adults do not acquire novel form-meaning connections without 
awareness.  
The differences between the results of Williams (2005) and subsequent extension 
studies might be due to two important factors: the research methodology and the modality of 
stimuli presentation. In terms of methodology, there were important differences in how 
awareness was measured. The awareness measures employed by Williams (2005), Faretta-
Stutenberg and Morgan-Short (2011) and Rebuschat et al. (2013) focused on the awareness of 
learning product, whereas Hama and Leow (2010) and Rebuschat et al. (2015) assessed 
awareness of learning as both a product and a process (see Leow, 2015, for an overview). 
Williams (2005), Hama and Leow (2010) and Faretta-Stutenberg and Morgan-Short (2011) 
did not include subjective measures to examine awareness of learning which, on the other 
hand, were employed by Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015). In addition, the stimulus presentation 
and the time permitted to enter a response (response window) in the exposure and testing 
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phases of these studies may have varied. With the exception of Chen et al.’s (2011) study, 
none of the authors of other studies clearly reported whether their multiple-choice tasks were 
timed or untimed, which makes it impossible to investigate the role of timing in these studies. 
Chen et al. (2011) reported that participants had to respond within 20 seconds during the 
training task, otherwise the next test item was presented. However, there was no information 
about timing during testing, which is potentially problematic, given that timing during test 
can affect the type of knowledge that is being assessed (R. Ellis, 2005; Gofroid et al., 2015; 
though see Vafaee, Suzuki, & Kachinske, 2017). 
Finally, given the stimuli specificity of implicit statistical learning (ISL; Conway & 
Christensen, 2006; Frost et al., 2015), the inconsistent use of modalities (auditory vs visual) 
in the exposure and test phases in Williams (2005) and its extension studies (Hama & Leow, 
2010; Rebuschat et al., 2013, 2015) may be one reason for the conflicting results (though see 
Plonsky, Marsden, Crowther, Gass & Spinner, 2019). Rebuschat et al. (2013) called for 
empirical research on a comparison between the effect of auditory and visual modality in 
implicit L2 learning.  
The effect of modality in implicit and incidental learning 
Recent research has demonstrated different modality effects in ISL, and Frost et al. 
(2015) have argued for the coexistence of domain generality and modality specificity in their 
novel ISL framework. For example, Conway and Christiansen (2006) found parallel effects 
of visual statistical learning and auditory statistical learning, and Silva, Folia, Inácio, Castro 
and Petersson’s study (2018) demonstrated similar behavioural outcomes across visual and 
auditory modalities. In contrast, two artificial grammar learning studies, Conway and 
Christiansen (2005, 2009), revealed that the auditory modality was superior to the visual 
modality. Modality effects were also found to depend on the presentation speed of stimuli, 
showing that audition is superior to vision at fast rates, whereas vision is superior to audition 
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at slow rates (Collier & Logan, 2000; Emberson, Conway, & Christiansen, 2011). 
Qualitatively, Conway and Christiansen (2009) found a visual advantage for a primacy effect 
(better recall of first elements in a list) and an auditory advantage for a recency effect (better 
recall of final elements in a list) in an ISL task, which is consistent with Beaman’s (2002) 
results regarding serial recall. ISL studies also suggest that auditory and visual input may be 
processed by separate mechanisms in the brain (Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Siegelman & 
Frost, 2015), which is supported by Silva et al.’s (2018) investigation of event-related 
potentials in response to grammar violations. It has also been found that ISL of artificial 
grammars can be transferred across different modalities (Altmann, Dienes & Goode, 1995). 
Additionally, differences in the developmental trajectory of auditory and visual ISL abilities 
have been observed in children (Raviv & Arnon, 2017). Taken together, most ISL studies 
have revealed multidimensional modality-specific effects, which are worth further 
investigation.  
Previous SLA research has also compared the effect of exposure modality (auditory 
vs visual). For example, Wong (2001) found better comprehension of written than auditory 
input. Leow’s (1993, 1995) studies of L2 learners of Spanish suggest that learners’ intake of 
both salient forms and less salient forms was equally successful from written input, whereas 
the intake of salient form was significantly more effective from auditory input. Cintrón-
Valentín and N. Ellis (2016) found that visual input directed learners’ attention to 
morphological cues more successfully than did aural input. More recently, Kim and Godfroid 
(2019) adapted the semi-artificial language developed by Rebuschat and Williams (2012) to 
examine differences in the incidental learning of German word order rules in auditory and 
visual input conditions. Participants were exposed to three verb placement rules in written 
and auditory modality and received implicit feedback in the exposure phase. In the written 
mode, participants had to read out the target sentences, whereas in the auditory mode they 
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listened and repeated the sentences. Implicit feedback meant that the participants were asked 
to repeat the sentences up to three times if they did not produce the correct word order. 
Similar learning effects were observed regardless of the modality of the input, but students 
developed implicit knowledge only in the visual condition. 
Previous research on the effect of assessment modality has compared grammaticality 
judgement tasks (GJT) in auditory and written modalities. Most studies have found learners’ 
performance is more accurate in written than in auditory grammaticality judgements 
(Johnson, 1992; Kim & Nam, 2017; Murphy, 1997; Shui, Yalçın, & Spada, 2018; Spada, 
Shui, & Tomita, 2015). Kim and Godfroid’s (2019) recent study found that participants 
scored better in the auditory GJT compared to a written GJT that was presented word by 
word, but they did not differ when the written GJT was shown in whole sentence format. 
Plonsky, Marsden, Crowther, Gass and Spinner’s (2019) recent meta-analysis suggests that 
modality effects in grammaticality judgements are neither strong nor stable. In contrast, their 
meta-analysis revealed large and reliable differences between untimed and timed 
grammaticality judgement tests, with participants scoring higher in untimed than timed 
conditions. Apart from GJT studies, there are very few studies on the effect of assessment 
modality in the field of SLA. Interestingly, Ziegler’s (2016) meta-analysis of synchronous 
computer-mediated communication (SCMC) and interaction revealed that the same modality 
of training and testing contributes significantly to learning gains. This lends support to 
models of transfer-appropriate processing, which argue that learning is more effective if the 
cognitive processes employed in the encoding of new information are similar to those that are 
used for the retrieval (and assessment) of newly learnt material (Roediger & Guynn, 1996). 
Research questions and predictions 
As highlighted above, the possibility of learning without awareness is still subject to 
debate in the domain of adult second language acquisition. Furthermore, there is a scarcity of 
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studies on the effect of exposure and assessment modality under incidental exposure 
conditions, and a potentially critical variable, namely the response window during exposure 
and test tasks, might not have been controlled rigorously in previous studies. The present 
study aimed to directly address these gaps. In doing so, we also intended to contribute to the 
debate on learning without awareness by further extending Williams’s (2005) study. To 
overcome the methodological shortcomings of previous research, we controlled the response 
window in both exposure and testing phases carefully. We also wanted to examine the 
effectiveness of incidental learning in a situation where the novel form-meaning connection is 
embedded in an L2 context. Our research addressed the following questions: 
1. What characterizes the knowledge that Chinese L2 users develop when exposed to 
novel determiners under incidental exposure conditions? 
2. How does modality of exposure and test phases (auditory vs written) influence the 
acquisition of novel determiners under incidental exposure conditions? 
As regards RQ1, based on Rebuschat et al.’s (2013, 2015) and Leung and Williams’ 
(2014) studies, we hypothesized that Chinese L2 users would be able to establish new form-
meaning connections in an incidental learning context, that is, without the intention to learn 
the hidden regularity and without advance knowledge of a test. Based on Hama and Leow 
(2010), Faretta-Stutenberg and Morgan-Short (2011) and Rebuschat et al. (2015), we 
expected that participants who demonstrated some level of awareness would display a greater 
learning effect than those participants who did not. In line with Rebuschat and Williams 
(2012) and Rebuschat et al. (2015), we expected to find evidence for both implicit 
(unconscious) knowledge and explicit (conscious) knowledge in the test phase. For RQ2, we 
predicted a facilitative effect of the auditory presentation mode based on the results of 
artificial grammar learning studies in the field of cognitive psychology (cf. Conway & 
Christiansen, 2005; 2009). Based on research findings on the role of modality in accuracy in 
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GJT, we hypothesized that participants’ response would be more accurate in the written 
mode. However, as a result of transfer appropriate processing (Roediger & Guynn, 1996), 
participants in the auditory exposure condition can be hypothesized to be more likely to give 




Eighty-eight students (42 women; Mage = 23.42) at a UK university volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four experimental conditions (n = 22 each). Participants in the auditory-
visual (AV) condition received auditory stimuli in the exposure phase and written test-items 
in the test phase. Participants in the visual-auditory (VA) condition were exposed to written 
stimuli and auditory test-items in the test phase, while those in the auditory-auditory (AA) 
condition received auditory stimuli in the exposure phase and the test phase. Finally, 
participants in the visual-visual (VV) condition received written stimuli in both the exposure 
phase and the test phase.  
All participants were native speakers of Chinese (Mandarin, n = 67; Cantonese, n = 
19) who were learning English as an L2. Their self-reported IELTS scores ranged from 6.0 to 
7.5, which is equivalent to B2 to C1 level in the Common European Framework of Reference 
(Council of Europe, 2001). Apart from English, 26 participants reported studying the 
following additional languages: Mandarin (n = 9), Japanese (n = 6), Spanish (n = 6), French 
(n = 6), German (n = 5), Korean (n = 3), Russian (n = 1), Minnan (n = 1) and Malay (n = 1). 
Seventeen participants (five in AV, two in VA, seven in AA, three in VV conditions) 
reported that they had taken courses in linguistics before the experiment. A series of Chi-
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square tests revealed that the groups did not differ significantly in terms of the distribution of 
age, gender, number of L2s and participants’ language background. 
Stimulus materials 
The training and test items were adapted from Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015). 
The artificial determiner system developed by Williams (2005) was used in this study. The 
system consists of four artificial determiners (gi, ro, ul, ne), whose usage depends on the 
distance and animacy of the associated noun. The determiners gi and ro are used with nouns 
that refer to near objects, and ul and ne refer to distant objects. The determiners gi and ul 
refer to animate (living) entities, whereas ro and ne refer to inanimate (non-living) entities. In 
line with previous studies, participants were instructed about the role of distance in 
determiner usage but the animacy regularity was not revealed to them. Animacy thus served 
as a hidden regularity. 
Training items 
The training items consisted of two training sets. Each set included 24 determiner-
noun combinations that were repeated three times over the exposure phase. These noun 
phrases (NPs) were constructed with 12 animate and 12 inanimate nouns. Half of the NPs in 
each category were presented in near-context sentences and the other half in far-context 
sentences. Half of the nouns in each category were in singular form and the other half in 
plural form. The order of the total of 144 sentences was randomized for each set, and 
plurality was counterbalanced within each set (see Table 1). That is, if gi rats was presented 
in Set 1, then gi rat was presented in a different context in Set 2; then Set 1 appeared again, 
and so on. Following Williams (2005, Experiment 2) and Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015), each 
noun was matched with only one determiner to guarantee that learning occurred as a result of 
establishing form-meaning connections rather than form-form associations between 
determiners. For example, there were gi rat/s (near-animate) but not ul rat/s (far-animate), so 
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that it could be concluded that gi is used with animate nouns, but not that any noun that 
follows gi can also be preceded by ul. The items used in training and testing are reproduced 
in Appendix A. Noun phrases are reproduced in Appendix B. 
Table 1 
Design of Training Items 









12 animate nouns 6 near-animate: gi + noun 3 3 
6 far-animate: ul + noun 3 3 
12 inanimate nouns 6 near-inanimate: ro + noun 3 3 
6 far-inanimate: ne + noun 3 3 
 
Test items  
Thirty-six new-context sentences were used to assess all participants. The sentences 
had not appeared during the exposure phase and were presented in the same random order. 
The sentences consisted of three types of NPs: trained, partially trained and untrained. The 
NPs in the trained items were those that appeared in exactly the same form in the exposure 
phase (e.g., gi rats). The NPs in the partially-trained items had appeared during exposure but 
were changed into opposite near-far determiners. For example, ul monkeys (far monkeys) that 
occurred in training was partially changed into gi monkeys (near monkeys) in the test. Novel 
nouns that had not occurred in the exposure phase were used to construct untrained items 
(e.g., gi goat). The animacy and inanimacy of NPs was counterbalanced, and items were 
presented to participants in random sequences (see Appendix C for a list of the nouns in the 
testing phase). 
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Given that the participants in the present study were non-native English speakers, we 
wanted to ensure that acquisition of the four artificial determiners would not be hindered by 
unknown or unfamiliar English words in the stimuli. Therefore, we made adaptations to the 
original training and test items from Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015). All English words and 
phrases in the original items were checked on the website English Vocabulary Profile 
(http://vocabulary.englishprofile.org). English words that were above B1 level on the CEFR 
were either replaced by synonyms or other words, or deleted. 
The training and test items used in the two modalities during the exposure and testing 
phases were identical, except that the order of training items within each set in the exposure 
phase in each modality was independently randomized for each participant. In the visual 
modality, written sentences were presented. In the auditory modality, audio recordings of the 
sentences read by a female native speaker of British English were played. To ensure learning 
and assessment of the artificial determiners would not be hindered by the English proficiency 
level of the participants, the speaker used a delivery rate of 100–120 words per minute, which 
is lower than the normal speaking rate (Crystal & House, 1990).  
For each training and test item, we calculated a time range during which participants 
could enter their responses. This response window was calculated based on the results of a 
preliminary pilot study (cf. procedures in Shiu et al., 2018). First, words per second for the 
shortest and longest trials of the two modalities from the pilot results were calculated. Then, 
these figures were used to divide the number of words of the shortest (6 words) and longest 
items (20 words) in the present study. That is, the response window took into account the 
time needed for reading or listening to the input stimulus, that is,  it included the presentation 
of the stimulus item as well. For the written modality, the response window ranged from 3–
15 seconds depending on the length of the sentence, and the response window in the auditory 
 18 
modality ranged from 5–12 seconds, again depending on the length of the stimulus sentence 
(see Appendix D for more details). 
Procedure 
All participants completed (i) vocabulary pretraining of the four artificial determiners 
for the distance regularity, (ii) an exposure phase, (iii) a testing phase, (iv) a retrospective 
verbal report interview and (v) a debriefing questionnaire. All participants met the 
experimenter individually in a quiet laboratory. The vocabulary pretraining, exposure and 
testing phases were delivered via Microsoft PowerPoint. All participants’ responses in the 
exposure and testing phases were screen recorded by Record It to ensure they had followed 
the instructions and their answers were recorded. The retrospective verbal report interviews 
were audio recorded. The debriefing questionnaires were administered via Qualtrics on a 
mobile device. The entire procedure took approximately one hour.  
Vocabulary pretraining 
The original material from Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015) was adapted for the present 
study. Instructions were translated into Chinese, and the pronunciation of each artificial 
determiner was recorded by the same female native speaker of British English. The modality 
of this session was mainly written (except the audio recordings). The purpose of the 
pretraining was to introduce the four artificial determiners and to instruct participants on the 
role of distance in determiner selection. Participants were informed that they would be tested 
after the pretraining and that they could complete the pretraining at their own pace. 
Participants were first presented with a list of the four new words and their meanings in 
English, together with the spoken form of the words. Then, they completed a first practice 
task by saying aloud the missing determiner that matched the English translation on the list of 
four determiners. Next, they carried out a second practice by saying aloud the English 
translations of the new words. The practice tasks gave participants feedback by presenting 
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correct answers after each response, and they exposed participants to 12 written repetitions of 
each artificial determiner. Participants were allowed to repeat this session as many times as 
they wished. Finally, the original quiz from Rebuschat et al. (2013, 2015) was used to test the 
participants on the distance meanings of the determiners on the online testing website 
ClassMarker. Following previous studies, participants were not allowed to continue to the 
exposure phase until they scored 90 per cent or higher on the quiz. Most of them were able to 
do so on their first attempt, except one participant from the written-auditory group who was 
only able to do this on second attempt. 
Exposure phase 
      Visual exposure. Written instructions adapted from Williams (2005, pp. 281–282) 
were translated into Chinese to explain that the general purpose of the experiment was to 
investigate whether people think differently in different languages, using the four artificial 
determiners. The participants were informed that the functions of the four novel determiners 
were similar to the English word the, but they also included distance meanings of objects. An 
example sentence (“The little boy patted gi tiger in the zoo”), which did not appear in the 
following sessions, was used to illustrate the function of this determiner in context.  
Then, the participants were instructed that they would see written sentences that 
included the novel determiners they had learnt from vocabulary pretraining. Their task was to 
read each sentence and judge, as quickly as possible, whether the determiner indicated far or 
near. They could respond by clicking F (far) or N (near) buttons located in the bottom left and 
right corners of the screen. They were informed that they would have only a few seconds to 
decide. The sentence then disappeared and the participants were required to form a mental 
image of the sentence, which was not be timed. The previous sample sentence was used as an 
illustration (i.e., the participants would imagine that a boy was patting a tiger that was near 
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them). A short practice session with four sentences which did not appear in subsequent 
sessions was given to all participants before the exposure.  
      Auditory exposure. The auditory exposure was identical to the written exposure 
except that the stimuli were delivered in auditory mode, which required participants to listen 
to the whole sentence before giving a response. This was designed differently from the 
written exposure to ensure participants did not skip any sentences. For each item, the 
response window was different from that in the written exposure. 
Testing Phase 
The learning of the hidden animacy was measured by means of a two-alternative 
forced-choice (2AFC).  
      Written 2AFC. Each sentence was displayed in the centre of the computer screen 
(e.g., “The lady is eating pasta with ___ fork”) with two choices of artificial determiners 
which differed only in animacy meaning but were the same in distance meaning (e.g., gi and 
ro). The two choices of determiners were located in the bottom left and right corners of the 
screen. The correct determiners appeared as the left and right choice with equal frequency. 
Participants were informed in written Chinese to choose the determiner that “seems more 
familiar, better, or more appropriate” (Williams, 2005, p. 282) and that this session was 
timed. They gave their responses by clicking one of the two determiners. Before the test, a 
short practice session with four sentences which did not appear in the test was given to all 
participants, but no feedback was given.  
Source attributions were used as a subjective measure of awareness to determine 
whether participants had acquired unconscious (implicit) or conscious (conscious) structural 
knowledge (Dienes & Scott, 2005). After entering their 2AFC response, participants were 
asked to report what their decision was based on. Here, they could select one of four options: 
guess, intuition, recollection or rule knowledge. Participants were instructed in written 
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Chinese to select guess only when they made their judgement by purely guessing (i.e., similar 
to flipping a coin); to select intuition when they made their judgement based on a gut feeling 
that they were correct but could not explain why; to select recollection when their choice was 
based on recollection of a similar sentence (or part of it) in the exposure phase; to select rule 
knowledge when their decision was based on a rule that they could verbalize after the test. 
Subjective measures have been introduced in implicit learning research by Dienes and Scott 
(2005) as more sensitive measures than retrospective verbal reports. In line with Dienes and 
Scott (2005), judgements attributed to guessing and intuition were taken as indications of 
unconscious structural knowledge, while judgements attributed to recollection and rule 
knowledge were assumed to reflect participants’ conscious structural knowledge (see also 
Chen et al., 2011). 
Auditory 2AFC. The auditory 2AFC test was identical to the written 2AFC test, 
except that it was delivered in the auditory mode and the response window for each test 
sentence was different from that in the written 2AFC test. The blank space in the written 
2AFC test was replaced by a beep sound which lasted 30 milliseconds. 
      Retrospective verbal reports. All participants were interviewed by the experimenter 
after the test. The interviews were conducted in the participants’ native language, that is, 
Mandarin or Cantonese. Following Rebuschat et al. (2015), the participants were first asked 
how they made their choices. If they mentioned any distinction related to living or non-living, 
they were asked when they had become aware of this distinction (exposure or test phase) and 
whether they had chosen rule knowledge as the source of their choices. If so, they were 
required to describe the rule or regularity. If participants had not chosen rule knowledge in 
the source attributions, they were asked about the other sources of their decisions. If 
participants did not make any reference related to animacy or if they did not use rule 
knowledge as the source of their judgments, they were told that there was a rule to distinguish 
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the two near/far determiners (i.e. gi and ro; ul and ne) and they were encouraged to guess the 
rule. If participants still did not refer to animacy, the experimenter presented the determiner 
system and then asked if they had been aware of the hidden regularity at any point during the 
experiment. The interview questions were designed to move from implicit to explicit 
knowledge gradually to investigate participants’ awareness of the hidden rule, so that the 
effect of the questions on participants’ awareness of the hidden regularity would be 
minimized. Different from Rebuschat et al.’s (2015) study, participants were also required to 
report their awareness of animacy in both phases of exposure and assessment, respectively.  
 Following Rebuschat et al.’s (2015) study, participants’ verbal reports were coded 
conservatively. Participants were considered to be aware of the hidden regularity even if they 
displayed only fleeting or partial awareness of the regularity in the verbal reports. To be 
considered unaware, participants could not make a mention to the animacy regularity, even 
after extensive and careful probing by the experimenter. The coding scheme to categorize 
aware and unaware participants can be found in Appendix E. 
Debriefing session. After the interviews, participants completed a brief questionnaire 
about their age, gender, field of study, native language(s), previous experience in linguistics 
courses, foreign language(s) studied, contexts of instruction and length of study.   
 
Analysis 
In order to answer RQ1, we conducted both frequentist and Bayesian one-sample t-
tests to investigate whether performance was significantly above chance and to examine 
whether the data provides statistical support for learning effects in performance (the 
alternative hypothesis or H1). Common in both frequentist and Bayesian one-sample t-tests, 
our alternative hypothesis predicted that participants’ performance would be better than by-
chance, and we thus adopted one-tailed t-tests (H1 > H0) for all the analyses. Our rationale for 
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reporting both frequentist and Bayesian statistical tests is to ensure the comparability of the 
current results with previous studies. However, one striking disadvantage of the Frequentist 
approach over the Bayesian approach is that non-significant results can indicate either the 
lack of target effects or the lack of sensitivity to detect the effects (e.g., underpowered 
design). This problem of logical status of non-significant results was solved by the Bayesian 
analysis which can distinguish the support for the null hypothesis from the lack of sensitivity 
(Keysers, Gazzola, & Wagenmakers, 2020). In addition, due to the use of p-value in 
hypothesis testing in a Frequentist approach, multiple comparisons would increase the rate of 
Type Ⅰ error, while with an adjustment of alpha level (e.g., the Bonferroni correction), the 
rate of Type Ⅱ error also increase. Since we conducted a total of 30 one-sample t-tests, 
particularly in our research context, a Bayesian approach, which does not rely on p-value, 
may provide robust results (For the comparisons of statistical results between raw and 
adjusted p-values of Frequentist approach and Bayesian approach, see Appendix F). 
Regarding the Bayesian analysis, we calculated a Bayes factor (BF10), which refers to 
the relative predictive performance of H1 to H0, using the JASP software (JASP Team, 2020) 
As recommended by Keysers et al. (2020), we used a default prior distribution for t-tests (the 
Cauchy distribution with a scale parameter of r = 0.707) to calculate BF10. Following Keysers 
et al. (2020) and Kim and Godfroid (2019), we set BF10 > 3.0 as the criterion for the evidence 
of learning effects. The 3.0 value of BF10 means that the given data was predicted three times 
better by H1 than H0. We also set BF10 < 0.333 (the inversed value of 3.0) as the absence of 
learning effects and the BF10 between 3.0 and 0.333 as the absence of evidence (i.e., 
insufficient to draw a conclusion; see Keysers et al., 2020). In addition to BF10, we also 
reported the median and 95% credible intervals of the posterior effect size δ, which is not 
simply equivalent to the Cohen’s d-value, because this effect size index reflects both the prior 
distribution and the data observed (Keysers et al., 2020).  
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In order to address RQ2, we performed the Generalized (logistic) Linear Mixed-
effects Modelling (GLMM) in R (R Core Team, 2018) using the lme4 package (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) to predict the accuracy of 2AFC items. We entered the 
binary variable representative of the correctness of answers (either correct (1) or incorrect 
(0)) as the dependent variable and the following variables as fixed effects (i.e., independent 
predictor variables): Exposure (auditory vs. written), Assessment (auditory vs. written), 
Training (trained, partially-trained and untrained items), Knowledge (conscious vs. 
unconscious structural knowledge, based on source attributions), and Awareness (aware vs. 
unaware based on retrospective interviews). In order to test the significance of a particular 
predictor variable while controlling for the effects of the other predictor variables, we 
adopted contrast coding, as opposed to dummy coding. For the variables with two levels 
(Exposure, Assessment, Knowledge), simple contrast coding was applied (-0.5, 0.5). 
Meanwhile, regarding the Training variable which had three levels, we regarded untrained 
items as the reference level and applied simple contrast coding to test the contrasts between 
untrained and partially-trained items and between untrained and trained items (see Appendix 
G). The same model building procedure was repeated for two different measures of 
awareness (Knowledge vs. Awareness). We entered the correctness of answers as the 
outcome variable and Exposure, Assessment, Training, and either Knowledge or Awareness 
as the fixed effects predictor variables. 
 
Results 
The role of awareness in learning novel determiners (RQ1) 
To determine if Chinese L2 learners could acquire the hidden regularity and to assess 
the role played by awareness (RQ1), we first analysed overall performance on the 2AFC task 
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(measure of learning), followed by closer analysis of the retrospective verbal reports and the 
source attributions provided by participants (measures of awareness). 
Performance on the 2AFC task. To determine if learning took place, we analysed 
performance on the 2AFCT task across all participants, independent of condition. As can be 
seen in Table 2, participants’ mean accuracy on the task was 0.542 (SD = 0.160), which was 
significantly above chance, t(87) = 2.45, p = .008, d = .26, thus indicating that learning of the 
hidden regularity occurred under incidental exposure conditions. The Bayesian analysis 
provided moderate evidence for learning effects above chance level (BF10 = 3.91, median 
posterior δ = .253, 95% CI = [.057, .462]). Furthermore, one-sample t tests indicated that 
participants performed significantly above chance on each test-item type: for the trained 
items, t(87) = 4.04, p < .001, d = .43; for the partially-trained items, t(87) = 2.41, p = .009, d 
= .26; for the untrained items, t(87) = 2.27, p = .013, d = .24. Using Plonsky and Oswald’s 
(2014) guidelines on the interpretation of Cohen’s d-values, all these effects are considered 
small. The Bayesian analysis showed extremely strong support for above chance learning 
effects on trained items (BF10 = 340.89, median posterior δ = .417, 95% CI = [.202, .634]) 
and moderate support for partially trained items (BF10 = 3.58, median posterior δ = .249, 95% 
CI = [.054, .458]). The results of the Bayesian analysis regarding untrained items were 
inconclusive (BF10 = 2.65, median posterior δ = .233, 95% CI = [.025, .443]). 
 
Table 2.  
Frequentist and Bayesian analysis of overall response accuracy and response accuracy for 
trained, partially trained and untrained items 
  Descriptive Statistics   Frequentist one-sample t-test   Bayesian one-sample t-test 
Condition N M SD 95%CI  t p d  BF10 Posterior δ 95%CI 
Overall 88 0.541 0.159 [.507, .575]  2.451 0.008 0.261  3.91 0.253 [.057, .462] 
–Trained item 88 0.583 0.192 [.542, .623]  4.042 < .001 0.431  340.89 0.417 [.202, .634] 
–Partially-trained item 88 0.548 0.187 [.508, .587]  2.411 0.009 0.257  3.58 0.249 [.054, .458] 
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–Untrained item 88 0.546 0.192 [.505, .587]   2.272 0.013 0.242   2.65 0.233 [.025, .443] 
 
Subjective measures of awareness. The analyses of the item-by-item source 
attributions provided during the completion of the 2AFC task showed that participants (across 
the four conditions) scored 0.576 (SD = 0.494) when basing their decisions on the explicit 
response categories (recollection and rule knowledge) and 0.550 (SD = 0.498) when basing 
decisions on the implicit response categories (guessing and intuition). The mean accuracy 
was significantly above chance in either case (explicit categories, t(1281) = 5.47, p < .001 d = 
.15.; implicit categories, t(1776) = 4.26, p < .001 d = .10). The Bayesian analysis provided 
extremely strong support for above chance learning effects in both implicit and explicit 
response categories (cf. Table 3).  
 
Table 3.  
Frequentist and Bayesian analysis of overall response accuracy and response accuracy for 
items based on subjective measures 
  Descriptive Statistics   
Frequentist one-sample t-
test   Bayesian one-sample t-test 
Condition N M SD 95%CI  t p d  BF10 Posterior δ 95%CI 
Explicit 
knowledge  1282 0.575 0.494 [.548, .602]  5.479 < .001 0.153  169102.18 0.153 [.098, .208] 
Implicit 
knowledge  1777 0.550 0.497 [.527, .573]   4.267 < .001 0.101   451.67 0.101 [.054, .148] 
 
Retrospective verbal reports. Our analysis of the retrospective verbal reports 
revealed that 52 participants reported knowledge of the animacy regularity, whereas 36 
participants did not. Based on their verbal reports (or lack thereof), we categorized the former 
participants as “aware” and the latter as “unaware” of the hidden regularity (see Table 2, and 
Appendix E for coding scheme). The aware participants correctly identified 0.562 (SD = 
0.194) of the test items and the unaware participants 0.512 (SD = 0.083). Analyses showed 
that aware participants scored significantly above chance in the 2AFC task, t(51) = 2.30, p = 
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.013, d =  .32, and that unaware participants did not, t(35) = .89, p = .190, d = .15. This 
suggests that, according to verbal reports, learning was limited to those participants who 
displayed at least some awareness, if only minimal, of the hidden regularity in their 
retrospective verbal reports. The Bayesian analysis showed moderate evidence for above 
chance learning effects for aware participants (BF10 = 3.32, median posterior δ = .304, 95% 
CI = [.058, .577]), whereas the results of the Bayesian analysis regarding overall learning 
effects in the unaware group were inconclusive (BF10 = 0.41, median posterior δ = .176, 95% 
CI = [.011, .467]). 
As a next step, we analysed the performance of aware and unaware participants across 
the three test-item types. The results show that aware participants performed above chance 
only on trained items (t(51) = 3.82, p < .001, d = .53), and that there was an extremely strong 
evidence for learning effects using the Bayesian analysis (BF10 = 141.30, median posterior δ 
= .504, 95% CI = [.220, .794]). In contrast, the unaware participants did not perform above 
chance on any test-item types. The Bayesian analysis indicates that there is insufficient 
evidence for the validity of either the null or the alternative hypothesis for any of the item 
types in the unaware group and for the partially trained and untrained items in the aware 
group (see Table 4). In other words, learning appeared limited to those participants who 
displayed at least some conscious knowledge of the hidden regularity in the verbal reports. 
Even in those cases, the learning effect was driven by above-chance performance on trained 
items, and there was no sufficient evidence of generalization. 
 
Table 4.  
Frequentist and Bayesian analysis of overall response accuracy and response accuracy for 
items based on retrospective measures 
 
Descriptive Statistics  Frequentist one-sample t-test  Bayesian one-sample t-test 
Condition N M SD 95%CI  t p d  BF10 Posterior δ 95%CI 
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Aware (Overall) 52 0.562 0.194 [.508, .616]  2.304 0.013 0.320  3.32 0.304 [.058, .577] 
–Trained 52 0.614 0.215 [.554, .674]  3.823 < .001 0.530  141.30 0.504 [.220, .794] 
–Partially-trained 52 0.560 0.221 [.499, .622]  1.963 0.028 0.272  1.72 0.262 [.037, .530] 
–Untrained 52 0.559 0.225 [.496, 622]  1.892 0.032 0.262  1.52 0.253 [.034, .530] 
Unaware (Overall) 36 0.512 0.083 [.484, .541]  0.889 0.190 0.148  0.41 0.176 [.011, .467] 
–Trained 36 0.538 0.146 [.489, .587]  1.568 0.063 0.261  1.02 0.254 [.025, .569] 
–Partially-trained 36 0.530 0.123 [.489, .572]  1.490 0.073 0.248  0.91 0.244 [.023, .556] 
–Untrained 36 0.529 0.133 [.484, .574]  1.291 0.103 0.215  0.68 0.220 [.018, .526] 
 
The effect of exposure and assessment modality (RQ2) 
To examine whether the modality used in the exposure and testing phases affected the 
acquisition of novel determiners, we analysed performance on the 2AFC task across groups. 
We found that the AA group scored highest (M = 0.614, SD = 0.155), followed by the AV 
group (M = 0.588, SD = 0.146), the VA group (M = 0.524, SD = 0.100) and the VV group (M 
= 0.471, SD = 0.197). One-sample t tests on the groups’ mean accuracy scores revealed that 
only the AA group performed above chance, t(21) = 3.45, p = .001, d = .74. Using Plonsky 
and Oswald’s (2014) guidelines on the interpretation of Cohen’s d-values, this effect is 
considered moderate, and the Bayesian analysis also showed very strong evidence for the 
existence of the overall learning effect in this group. Regarding the AV group, the results of 
one-sample t-tests in Frequentist and Bayesian approaches did not concur (t(21) = 1.87, p = 
.038, d = .40, BF10 = 1.85, median posterior δ = .364, 95% CI = [.043, .780]). Considering the 
robustness of Bayesian analysis, we regarded the leaning gains in the AV group as the 
evidence of absence rather than the lack of learning effects. (i.e., inconclusive evidence). The 
other groups’ performance did not differ significantly from chance: the VA group, t(21) = 
1.12, p = .134, d = .24, the VV group, t(21) = -.69, p = .751, d = -.15. The Bayesian analysis 
showed inconclusive evidence for overall learning effects in the VA groups and revealed 
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis in the VV group (BF10 = 0.14, median posterior δ 
= .096, 95% CI = [.004, .367]). We then investigated whether performance differed across 
test-item types. One-sample t tests showed that only the AV group performed above chance 
 29 
on all test-item types, and the Bayesian analyses suggested moderate evidence for these 
learning effects. The AA group performed above chance on trained test items and partially-
trained test items and the evidence for the significance of these learning effects was 
extremely strong for trained items (BF10 = 136.65, median posterior δ = .804, 95% CI = 
[.322, 1.305]) and strong for untrained items (BF10 = 10.36, median posterior δ = .548, 95% 
CI = [.133, 1.001]). The other groups did not score above chance on any test-item types. In 
the VA group the Bayesian analysis showed an absence of evidence either for the null or the 
alternative hypothesis for all item types, whereas in the VV group there was sufficiently 
strong evidence for the null hypothesis (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  
Frequentist and Bayesian analysis of overall response accuracy and response accuracy for 
items based in different exposure and assessment conditions 
 
 Descriptive Statistics  Frequentist one-sample t-test  Bayesian one-sample t-test 
Condition N M SD 95%CI  t p d  BF10 Posterior δ 95%CI 
AV (Total) 22 0.558 0.146 [.493, .623]  1.866 0.038 0.398  1.85 0.364 [.043, .780] 
–Trained 22 0.597 0.185 [.515, .679]  2.470 0.011 0.527  5.07 0.474 [.089, .913] 
–Partially-trained 22 0.584 0.171 [.509, .660]  2.315 0.015 0.494  3.87 0.445 [.075, .878] 
–Untrained 22 0.597 0.199 [.508, .685]  2.277 0.017 0.486  3.63 0.438 [.071, .870] 
VA (Total) 22 0.524 0.100 [.480, .568]  1.124 0.137 0.240  0.66 0.248 [.018, .630] 
–Trained 22 0.553 0.148 [.487, .619]  1.665 0.055 0.355  1.37 0.330 [.034, .738] 
–Partially-trained 22 0.525 0.135 [.465, .585]  0.869 0.197 0.185  0.49 0.215 [.013, .583] 
–Untrained 22 0.519 0.155 [.450, .588]  0.574 0.286 0.122  0.36 0.182 [.010, .533] 
AA (Total) 22 0.614 0.155 [.545, .682]  3.449 0.001 0.735  33.40 0.666 [.217, 1.141] 
–Trained 22 0.669 0.192 [.584, .754]  4.128 < .001 0.880  136.65 0.804 [.322, 1.305] 
–Partially-trained 22 0.612 0.184 [.531, .694]  2.856 0.005 0.609  10.36 0.548 [.133, 1.001] 
–Untrained 22 0.568 0.172 [.492, .644]  1.861 0.038 0.397  1.84 0.363 [.043, .779] 
VV (Total) 22 0.471 0.197 [.384, .558]  -0.691 0.751 -0.147  0.14 0.096 [.004, .367] 
–Trained 22 0.513 0.216 [.417, .609]  0.286 0.389 0.061  0.28 0.155 [.008, .488] 
–Partially-trained 22 0.471 0.226 [.371, .571]  -0.609 0.726 -0.130  0.15 0.099 [.004, .375] 
–Untrained 22 0.503 0.234 [.399, .606]  0.055 0.478 0.012  0.23 0.137 [.006, .455] 
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To further investigate variances in each group’s performance across test-item types, 
we constructed the parsimonious models of GLMM in two steps (for the full model, see 
Appendix H). In the first step of the analysis, we examined whether the model fit to the 
current data was improved by adding the fixed-effects predictors and their interactions, while 
keeping the random effects constant. In order to compare the simpler models with the more 
complex ones, we used the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT; Baayen, 2008) and evaluated 
whether the inclusion of fixed-effects predictors was justified. To this end, we started with a 
minimal model of the log odds response accuracy (Model 1), which included the random 
intercepts of participants and items. We compared the minimal model with the models with 
one of the fixed-effect factors—Exposure (Model 2), Assessment (Model 3), Training (Model 
4), or Knowledge type (Model 5). The LRT revealed that only Model 2 improved the 
(Exposure) model fit to the data, compared to the minimal model, indicating that only 
Exposure was the significant predictor for response accuracy, χ2(1) = 7.842, p = .0051. Then, 
although we added each of the remaining three fixed-effects factors to Model 2, none of them 
further improved the model fit. In addition, there was no significant interaction effect 
between Exposure and those non-significant fixed-effects factors. Therefore, we included one 
fixed-effects factor for the final model. 
In the second step of the analysis, we examined whether to include the random slopes 
of participants and items in the slope of the fixed-effect factor (Exposure). Note that we 
decided to include both random intercepts of Participants and Items considering the 
hierarchical structure of our data. The LRT tests confirmed that neither of random-slope of 
participants (χ2(2) = 0.056, p = .972) and items (χ2(2) = 1.986, p = .370) improved the model 
fit. Therefore, our finalized model was specified as follows: 
  
Response Accuracy ~ Exposure + (1|Participant) + (1|Item) 
 31 
  
Another similar model following the same procedures was run where Knowledge was 
replaced by Awareness (aware vs. unaware, based on retrospective verbal reports). The full 
model is reported in Appendix I. The full model does not include interactions and random 
slopes because that complex model made the estimation very unstable and failed to converge. 
Both of the GLMMs predicting the accuracy of 2AFC scores included a significant main 
effect of Exposure. There were no other significant main effects or significant interactions 
between the predictor variables. None of the variables except for Exposure improved the 
model fit compared to the baseline model which included only random intercepts of 
Participant and Item. Therefore, we only report the final model which includes exposure as 
the main effect in Table 6. The odds ratios for this model predicted participants to be 1.52 
(1/.66) times more likely to respond correctly in the auditory exposure condition than in the 
written exposure condition. Following Plonsky and Oswald (2014), we interpret R2 with a 
value lower than .16 as small effects. The main effects model had a marginal R2 of .012 and a 
conditional R2 of .111, which indicates that exposure condition alone as well as the exposure 
condition and the random effects explain a relatively small amount of variance in the 
accuracy of responses. 
Table 6 
Summary of the final model 
      Odds 
Ratios 
95%CI of Odds 
Ratios     
Fixed effects Estimate SE Lower Upper z-value p 
(Intercept) 0.27 0.08 1.31 1.12 1.52 3.46 < .001 
Exposure -0.42 0.15 0.66 0.49 0.88 -2.85 0.004 
Random 
effects 
(intercepts) Variance SD           
Participant 0.35 0.59      
Item 0.02 0.13      
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Information 
criterion Estimate             
LogLikelihood -2032.7       
DIC 4065.4       
AIC 4071.4       
BIC 4089.4       
R2 Estimate             
Marginal 0.012             
Conditional 0.111             
Note. Auditory exposure is the reference level for Exposure.    
 
Discussion 
Establishing form-meaning connections under incidental exposure conditions 
In our first research question, we examined the acquisition of novel form-meaning 
connections by adult learners under incidental exposure conditions. In line with our 
predictions and previous research (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Hama & Leow, 2010; Leung and 
Williams, 2014; Rebuschat et al., 2013, 2015; Williams, 2005), the findings confirm that 
adult learners can learn a hidden regularity that governs determiner selection in a miniature 
linguistic system. However, the overall learning effect was found to be relatively small, and 
the Bayesian analysis only showed moderate support for the alternative hypothesis. This 
could be explained by the fact that the determiners were processed at a relatively low level of 
depth of cognitive processing (cf. Leow, 2015). In our study, a novel structure was embedded 
in L2 sentences, and even though these sentences were simple and contained familiar 
vocabulary, our participants might not have had sufficient attentional resources for processing 
and encoding the new meaning of the determiners. The small learning effects might also be 
explained by the characteristics of the participants’ L1 (Mandarin and Cantonese) in which 
there are no classifiers that specifically distinguish between animate and inanimate nouns. 
Instead, the elaborate classifier system denotes specific characteristics of objects such as 
flatness or length. The participants’ learned attention to these other types of semantic cues 
 33 
and subsequent processing bias that originates from their native language (cf. Ellis & Sagarra, 
2010) might also explain the small and predominantly exemplar-based learning effects, which 
were found to have very strong evidence of learning using Bayesian analysis (cf. also Leung 
&Williams, 2014 for a similar argument). 
In terms of our awareness measures, the analyses of the retrospective verbal reports 
showed that learning was limited to aware participants who were able to verbalize knowledge 
associated with the hidden regularity at the end of the experiment. The effect size of learning 
for the aware group was small, and the alternative hypothesis was only moderately supported 
by the Bayesian analysis. Significant learning was only observable for those test items that 
were repeated from the training phase (trained items) in the aware group. The very strong 
support for the above chance learning effects in the aware group on trained items from the 
Bayesian analysis also highlights that most learning in the experiment took place through 
memorization and was exemplar-based. These results are consistent with those of Faretta-
Stutenberg and Morgan-Short (2011), Hama and Leow (2010) and Rebuschat et al. (2015) 
but contradict the findings of Williams (2005), who showed that unaware participants can 
perform above chance level. Our Bayesian analysis also indicates that in the unaware group 
there is insufficient evidence to either confirm or reject the alternative hypothesis. The small 
and unstable effects across studies might be due to sensitivity to input frequency, insufficient 
statistical power, and variations in the sample and research methodology. 
The analysis of participants’ source attributions indicated the presence of both 
implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) knowledge at test, as evidenced by above-
chance performance when 2AFC decisions were based on implicit categories (guessing, 
intuition) and explicit categories (recollection, rule knowledge). This confirms the 
observations made in previous studies that investigated the effect of incidental exposure on 
the acquisition of form-meaning connections (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Monaghan, 
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Schoetensack, & Rebuschat, 2019; Rebuschat et al., 2015), L2 vocabulary (e.g., Hamrick & 
Rebuschat, 2012, 2014), L2 morphology (e.g., Grey et al., 2014), and L2 syntax (e.g., Kim & 
Godfroid, 2019) in adult learners. The results also confirm that reliance on retrospective 
verbal reports might not be sufficient to detect the presence of unconscious knowledge as 
these tests might not be sensitive enough (see Rebuschat et al., 2015, for discussion). The 
presence of implicit knowledge at test does not imply that learning necessarily occurred 
without awareness, given that subjective measures assess awareness of the learning product, 
not the learning process, but it suggests that the required level of awareness can be relatively 
low, for instance, at the level of Schmidt’s (1990) noticing. It is also important to 
acknowledge that subjective measures of awareness (like most behavioural measures of 
awareness) are not without problems (for a thorough investigation of the limitations of source 
attributions, see for example Sachs, Hamrick, McCormick & Leow, 2020). Clearly, more 
research is necessary to assess the internal validity of awareness measures.  
The role of modality in incidental language learning 
Our study also sought to investigate the effect of modality on the incidental learning 
of novel determiners in the exposure and assessment phases, respectively. The results of 
GLMM showed a significant benefit with a small effect size for auditory exposure, but the 
modality of assessment did not influence performance in the testing phase of the study. No 
significant main effects for awareness, knowledge-type or training were detected either, and 
there was no interaction among any of these variables. Therefore, the final model of GLMM 
in which with the item-level subjective measure of knowledge type was included as a 
predictor confirmed the results of both the frequentist and the Bayesian one-sample t-tests. 
However, the GLMM with the retrospective measure of awareness as the predictor variable 
was not fully in line with the results of the frequentist or the Bayesian one-sample t-tests, as it 
showed no effects of awareness or item-type, whereas above chance learning effects were 
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observed for aware participants on trained items and in the auditory exposition conditions for 
trained and partially trained items. As above chance learning effects were relatively small in 
all conditions except for the auditory exposure and auditory assessment group, it is not 
unexpected that the GLMM which took into account random intercept variations at 
participant and item levels did not detect these main effects. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the success of incidental learning might depend on 
the modality of exposure. The beneficial effects of auditory input seem to apply in our study 
in comparison with Kim and Godfroid’s (2019) research because our participants did not 
engage in additional processing such as repetition of the sentences and they did not receive 
feedback. In this respect, our design is similar to artificial grammar learning studies in 
cognitive psychology, which found that the auditory modality is superior to the written 
modality in ISL (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2005, 2009; Drewnowski & Murdock, 1980; 
Qi, Araujo, Georgan, Gabrieli, & Arciuli 2018). Our research demonstrates that the incidental 
learning of novel form-meaning connections is assisted by auditory input regardless of the 
level of awareness or whether judgements were made based on conscious or unconscious 
knowledge. Furthermore, the auditory facilitation effect can be observed irrespective of 
whether items were trained, partially trained or untrained. Therefore, our results might 
indicate that auditory sequences are more successfully remembered, which might support 
extraction of statistical regularities more effectively than visual input. This finding seems to 
provide indirect support for the non-unitary nature of statistical learning ability by showing 
superior auditory modality effects for linguistic stimuli (cf. Frost, Armstrong & Christiansen, 
2019). Our findings showing the superiority of the auditory exposure mode in incidental 
learning conditions are also in line with recent research in the field of L1 literacy 
development, which has shown that auditory statistical learning ability is a better predictor of 
word and sentence reading fluency than visual statistical learning ability (Qi et al., 2019). 
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As regards the lack of a significant effect of the assessment modality, the findings 
seem to contrast with previous studies that found that learners’ accuracy is higher in written 
forced-choice tasks than auditory ones (e.g., Johnson, 1992; Kim & Nam, 2017; Murphy, 
1997; Shui et al., 2018; Spada et al., 2015). However, our results support the conclusions of 
Plonsky et al.’s (2019) meta-analysis that revealed unstable effects of modality in 
grammaticality judgment performance. As discussed above, potential differences in the 
length of response window during the tasks in previous studies may explain the contradictory 
findings. In our research, we did not detect evidence of transfer appropriate processing either 
as no interaction between the input modality and assessment mode was found. Nonetheless, 
the frequentist and Bayesian one-sample t-tests indicated that the strongest evidence for the 
alternate hypothesis can be detected in the auditory exposure and auditory assessment group 
which might indicate some advantage for the auditory mode both in exposure and assessment.  
 
Conclusion 
 The present study investigated the acquisition of form-meaning connections 
by adult participants under incidental exposure conditions. As an original contribution to the 
study of incidental language learning, we also examined the effect of modality in both 
exposure and test phases. The findings showed small, but significant learning effects among 
participants supporting numerous previous studies that employed the paradigm developed by 
Williams (2005). However, in light of the Bayesian analysis, we interpret this finding 
cautiously as the evidence for the learning effect was overall only moderate and was 
extremely strong only for trained items (in contrast to Rebuschat et al., 2015). We 
demonstrate that incidental exposure can result in implicit and explicit knowledge but argue 
that some level of awareness is facilitative for the establishment of accurate form-meaning 
relationships, especially when a novel grammatical construction is embedded in a sentence-
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level L2 context and when the participants’ native language may contribute to a processing 
bias.  
It also needs to be noted that statistical analyses that group participants into aware and 
aware categories based on retrospective reports have much lower statistical power due to the 
small sample size than subjective analyses that give information on the basis of participants’ 
accuracy decisions for each item. Our Bayesian analyses indicated that there is no sufficient 
empirical basis for either the null or the alternative hypotheses except for the aware 
participants’ overall scores and their scores on trained items. Therefore it would be important 
to conduct larger scale studies and a meta-analysis of existing research that would compare 
learning effects based on retrospective reports of awareness. 
In terms of the effects of modality, our findings extend the results of previous studies 
that have demonstrated the benefits of the auditory exposure modality over the written 
modality (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2005, 2009; Drewnowski & Murdock, 1980; Qi et 
al., 2018). The lack of effect of the assessment modality is in line with the conclusions of a 
recent meta-analysis by Plonsky et al. (2019), who showed that, in forced-choice tasks, 
modality effects are small and prone to variation based on the research methodology.  
One of the limitations of our study is that we did not employ an L1-speaking control 
group as a baseline for the performance of the experimental groups. Future research with this 
additional group and with participants whose L1 denotes animacy in their classifier or 
determiner system could reveal to what extent the L2 sentence context and the learned 
attention of the Mandarin and Cantonese speaking participants influenced our findings. In our 
study, we did not assess participants’ productive knowledge or the longer-term duration of 
learning effects. Follow-up studies could be conducted that examine how incidental exposure 
conditions can promote the active recall of form-meaning links and how stable the 
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representations of these links are over time. More research is also necessary to investigate the 
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Appendix A Stimuli used in the study 
Training Practice Items 
1. The farmer caught gi chicken near him.  
2. The old man saw ul dolphins in the sea.  
3. The students used ro pencils to draw pictures.  
4. After the storm, ne roof was damaged by a tree. 
 
Training Items (Set 1) 
1. I tried to play dead while gi bear saw me. 
2. Yesterday the cook was bitten by gi rats in the kitchen. 
3. The child screamed although ul bee was on the other side of the playground. 
4. The tiger wanted to eat ul birds up in the tree. 
5. I carefully packed my nephew's present in ro box with newspaper. 
6. After the waitress dropped ro cups on the floor she had to leave her job. 
7. I couldn't read the title of ne book that was on the top shelf. 
8. From the kitchen I heard the sound of ne plate crashing to the floor. 
9. The owner gave a snack to gi dog for his trick. 
10. I held gi pig carefully so he would not escape.  
11. On the journey to look at wild animals, the children were excited that gi lions were 
beside the car. 
12. The teenagers pushed over gi cows in the field. 
13. The old lady pointed at ul cat stuck at the top of the tree. 
14. I could see ul fly on the television screen from the back of the classroom. 
15. The sound of ul monkeys in the top of the tree was extremely loud. 
16. I was frightened to see ul snakes on the other side of the garden. 
17. The detective looked at ro picture carefully for information about the crime.  
18. The workers carefully carried ro sofa up the stairs. 
19. The children all sat down at ro tables to play board games. 
20. The thief put ro televisions into his van. 
21. I stood back to see how well ne cushion matched the couch. 
22. I could not sleep because of the sound of ne clocks downstairs. 
23. We hoped that ne cakes would be delivered in time for the party. 
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24. The thieves searched the living room for ne vases kept in the study. 
 
Training Items (Set 2) 
1. The park officer told us that gi bears were not dangerous.  
2. While I was sitting in the kitchen gi rat ran between my feet. 
3. The paranoid man felt certain that there are ul bees in the box up in the tree. 
4. The scientist tried to take a picture of ul bird from the jungle floor. 
5. I stood on top of ro boxes to reach the light bulb. 
6. I pushed ro cup accidentally and the coffee spilled on my book. 
7. I asked the library staff to fetch ne books from the information desk. 
8. The children threw baseballs at ne plates to win prizes at the fair. 
9. We were attacked by gi dogs as we walked down the path. 
10. The farmer could not stand the smell of gi pigs when he cleaned their place.  
11. I was terrified when I turned around and saw gi lion right behind me. 
12. The vet carefully checked gi cow at the farm. 
13. In the night we heard ul cats fighting in the road outside. 
14. We heard the sound of ul flies coming together in a large group around the dead 
animal. 
15. The children threw sticks at ul monkey in the tree. 
16. We could see ul snake eating a chicken from behind the trees. 
17. The art museum staff checked ro pictures for signs of damage. 
18. The guests sat down on ro sofas in the living room. 
19. I spent an hour cleaning ro table before the dinner party. 
20. The girl went to bed later than usual watching ro television by her bed. 
21. I wanted to buy ne cushions from the store down the street. 
22. I looked up at ne clock on the church and realized that I was late. 
23. In the cafe I asked the waiter to get me ne cake. 
24. I wanted to see ne vase at the far end of the museum. 
 
Test Practice Items 
1. The girl was scared because of gi spiders over on the wall.  
2. Ul giraffe is walking fast outside the hotel window.  
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3. The lady is eating pasta with ro fork.  
4. There are people in ne boats in the sea far from the island.   
 
Test Items  
1. The babysitter poured juice into ro cups for the children.  
2. I heard the sound of ul cat from the old building on the farm.  
3. The boy played with gi monkeys in the rainforest. 
4. I pushed ro television to one side to make room for the new speakers.  
5. I was terrified when I heard ul bears making a loud noise in the distance.  
6. As I was passing I knocked ro vase onto the floor.  
7. I ordered ne book from the library.  
8. The student was happy that gi goat was awake all night to stay with her so that she 
is not alone.  
9. When I had a backache I asked my wife to fetch ne cushions from the bedroom.  
10. On the bus, the passengers saw ul insects eating leaves on a rock.  
11. The waitress was told to go and clear ne table at the end of the dinner.  
12. The photographer took a very beautiful photo of ul camels across the sand hills.  
13. The child wasn't able to see ne box of biscuits hidden up on top of the fridge.  
14. The farmer was kicked by gi cow when he tried to milk it.  
15. The tourists had trouble reading ne clocks on the towers across the river.  
16. The circus performer covered herself with gi snakes so that we could take a photo.  
17. The hunter noticed ul lion behind the tree from a far distance.  
18. The teacher made the bad students sit in ro desks right in front of her.  
19. I was amazed when gi bird ate from my hand.  
20. The children washed ro plates clean after the meal.  
21. The smell of ul pig coming from the farm next door was disgusting.  
22. I was surprised when ro phone rang in my hand.  
23. From my apartment window, I could see ne candles lit in a nearby park.  
24. The chef tried to hit gi rats with a stick.  
25. She asked her husband to turn off ne lamp in the other room.  
26. I couldn’t see ul horses in the field without glasses.  
27. After the party we stored ro cakes in the fridge.  
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28. The child held gi rabbit at the petting zoo.  
29. The researchers studied ul bees from a safe distance.  
30. When I was out for a walk I touched gi dog and it bit me.  
31. In the gallery we all admired ne pictures from the other side of the room.  
32. I spent the night on ro sofa and let my guests sleep in the beds.  
33. The man put away ro spoons in the drawer.  
34. The kids at the zoo fed gi elephants peanuts right from their hands.  
35. The man had to look carefully to see ul flies over on the wall.  













Appendix B Nouns Phrases (48) Employed in the Exposure Phase 
Training set 1 animate inanimate 
near far near far 
gi bear ul bee ro box ne book 
gi pig ul fly ro sofa ne plate 
gi dog ul cat ro picture ne cushion 
gi rats ul birds ro cups ne clocks 
gi lions ul monkeys ro tables ne cakes 
gi cows ul snakes ro televisions ne vases 
Training set 2 animate inanimate 
near far near far 
gi bears ul bees ro boxes ne books 
gi pigs ul flies ro sofas ne plates 
gi dogs ul cats ro pictures ne cushions 
gi rat ul bird ro cup ne clock 
gi lion ul monkey ro table ne cake 





Appendix C Noun Phrases (36) Employed in the Testing Phase 
 animate inanimate 
 near far near far 
Trained gi cow ul cat ro cups ne book 
Trained gi rats ul bees ro television ne cushions 
Trained gi dog ul flies ro sofa ne clocks 
Partially-trained gi monkeys ul bears ro vase ne table 
Partially-trained gi snakes ul lion ro plates ne box 
Partially-trained gi bird ul pig ro cakes ne pictures 
New gi goat ul insects ro desks ne candles 
New gi rabbit ul camels ro phone ne lamp 









Appendix D Response Windows (RW) of the Training and Test Items in the Two Modalities 
Length of the item (words) RW for written modality 
(second) 
RW for auditory modality 
(second) 
6 3s 5s 
7 4s 5s 
8 5s 6s 
9 5s 6s 
10 6s 7s 
11 6s 7s 
12 7s 8s 
13 8s 8s 
14 9s 9s 
15 10s 9s 
16 11s 10s 
17 12s 10s 
18 13s 11s 
19 14s 11s 







Appendix E Coding scheme for categorizing awareness (adapted from Rebuschat et al. 
(2015) 
Code Description 
Full-confident Full and accurate characterization of the animacy regularity, with confidence in reporting 
it 
Full-hesitant Full and accurate characterization of the animacy regularity but with hesitation in 
reporting it (e.g., mentioned only after being prompted to speculate) 
Partial Participants referred to partial characterization of the animacy regularity, or they 
mentioned a relevant category of the hidden regularity, such as animals or objects, living 
or non-living things. However, they could not further explain the animacy meanings of 
the determiners.  
Minimal  Participants did not make any references related to animacy. However, after having been 
told the rule by the researcher, they indicated very brief or fleeting awareness of the 
hidden rule, which had occurred during the experiment. 
Unaware Participants did not make any references related to animacy and reported that they had not 
become aware of the hidden regularity (animacy) at any point during the experiment. 
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Appendix F The full omnibus model 
 
        
95%CI of Odds 
Ratios         
Fixed effects Estimate SE 
Odds 
Ratios Lower Upper z-value p     
(Intercept) 0.53 0.15 1.70 1.25 2.29 3.43 < .001     
Exposure: Written -0.42 0.15 0.66 0.49 0.88 -2.82 0.005     
Assessment: Written -0.13 0.15 0.88 0.66 1.17 -0.87 0.383     
Training: Partially trained 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.82 1.22 -0.02 0.986     
Training: Trained 0.16 0.10 1.17 0.96 1.44 1.54 0.123     
Knowledgetype: 
Unconscious -0.07 0.09 0.93 0.78 1.11 -0.81 0.418     
Random effects 
(intercepts) Variance SD               
Participants 0.35 0.59          
Item 0.01 0.11          
ICC 0.10           
Information criterion Estimate                 
LogLikelihood -2029.6           
DIC 4059.3           
AIC 4075.3           
BIC 4123.5           
R2 Estimate                 
Marginal 0.015                 
Conditional 0.112                 
Note. The reference level for Exposure is Auditory; the reference level for Assessment is Written; the reference level for Training is Untrained;  
the reference level for Knowledgetype is  Conscious. 
 
